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Executive Summary  
Starting in 2008, major changes to the federal student loan system have increased the 
generosity and flexibility of repayment options. In theory, these efforts should reduce the effect 
of the business cycle on default patterns. However, since 2007, student loan default rates have 
persisted in rising. In response, several student loan advocates have proposed replacing the 
standard program with the income-based repayment program as the automatic repayment option.  
This stakeholder analysis explores the potential of this proposal from the perspective of 
borrowers, academic institutions, and student loan servicers through a literature review of 
empirical research of student loan default behaviors, quantitative analysis of cohort default rates, 
and exploratory interviews. This research does not strongly support the broad statement that 
automatic enrollment in income-based repayment would eliminate the problem of student loan 
defaults. However, of all repayment options, the income -based is best suited to meet the needs 
of financially stressed borrowers, and the stakeholder analysis uncovers some practical 
opportunities to leverage current infrastructures and institutional needs to improve outcomes.  
This analysis recommends that the Department of Education consider piloting two default 
reduction efforts in order to promote income-based repayment programs: (1) partner with schools 
that have the largest number of associated defaulted loans to develop targeted counseling 
services prior to loan disbursement and (2) partner with servicers to test the effectiveness of 
making the income-based repayment program the automatic option upon entering into 
repayment. Though the income-based repayment program will not fully solve the problem of the 
rising burden of student loans, it provides a promising structure to reduce the financial burden of 
higher education debt.  
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Problem in Context  
Too many student loan borrowers have gone into default, though the policies around 
repayment make default largely avoidable. Following targeted legislation in the early 1990’s to 
hold schools accountable for student loan default rates and increase repayment flexibility, annual 
measurements of two-year default rates showed a consistent downward trend, reaching a low of 
4.9% in 2003 (Chart 1). However, since 2008 default rates have risen 75% to an alarming 9.1%.
1
 
Even more troubling, the Department of Education (ED) estimates a total lifetime default rate of 
23%,
2
 and some analysts worry that ED has underestimated these rates and the related costs.
3
 
Defaulted loans increase the cost to the government of providing a federally guaranteed student 
loan program. Furthermore, they result in higher costs to the borrower in the form of collection 
fees, marred credit scores, and garnished paychecks and tax returns.  
Chart 1 – Two-Year Cohort Default Rates by Year Measured (1989-2012) 
 
     Source: Baum, Sandy and Kathleen Payea. “Student Aid Trends.” (CollegeBoard, 2012) 
 
 
The dollar value of outstanding loans has increased by 62% in the past decade, 
amounting to $864 billion in aggregate debt.
 4
 This combined with higher default rates has led to 
increased concerns in the media about the “student loan bubble” and its potential to ignite the 
next American financial crisis and/or hamper economic recovery. For example, lower rates of 
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home purchases by thirty to forty-year-olds suggests that young adults are over-leveraged and 
delaying major “life” expenditures, which are also traditionally drivers of economic recovery.5 
Although the correlation with the recession suggests that the problem of default is 
primarily economic, the theory behind the current federal repayment policies should effectively 
insulate federal loans from economic downturns. Since 1993, Federal Direct Loans have 
qualified for repayment programs based upon income, offering repayments as low as $0 and 
forgiveness after twenty-five years of keeping loans in good standing. The program did not 
initially cover the Family Federal Education Loan Program (FFELP), which promoted student 
loans origination by private banks through federal guarantees, and so had limits to the relief it 
could provide. Passage of the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) program in 2007 and subsequent 
additions of even more generous policies extended access to these repayment options to FFELP 
loan holders. (See Appendix I for comparisons between various repayment options).  
It is difficult to say whether the programs reduced the impact of the recession on student 
loan default rates. However, their correlated rise with the financial crisis strongly suggests that 
the program has not yet broken the connection between economic conditions and student loan 
default. Several problems in implementation plagued IBR in its early days, such as accidently 
omitting it as an option on the Financial Student Aid’s website6 and unexpected servicer transfer 
problems.
7
 Notably, Inside Higher Ed reported last year that, although over 5.4 million 
Americans were delinquent on their student loans, only 1.6 million had enrolled in IBR and only 
another 447,000 in the income-contingent program. This gap suggests the program has not yet 
reached many who could benefit from it.
8
 Furthermore, due to rising levels of enrollment, tuition, 
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and borrowing limits, loan servicers are preparing for Federal Direct programs to rise by 9% over 
the next three years, increasing the urgency of the default problem.
9
  
In response to mounting student loan pressures and the apparent gap in IBR enrollment, 
several education-related think tanks, including the CollegeBoard, The Institute for College 
Access & Success, American National Consumer Law Center, and the Association of University 
Women, have endorsed enrollment in IBR programs as a key strategy reducing default rates.
10
 
Some, such as the Committee for Economic Development and Young Invincibles recommend 
that the IBR become the default repayment option upon entering repayment, ensuring that 
students would not bear unreasonable hardship due underemployment post-graduation.
11
 
While this recommendation appears to be a logical next-step, the theory of its 
effectiveness and feasibility rests on several assumptions that deserve further analysis: (1) the 
change would effectively target and help the population most prone to student loan default and 
(2) the incentive structures of major stakeholders would lead to the desired outcomes. This 
analysis attempts to shed light on these two assumptions, as well as assess if different strategies 
are necessary based upon loan type or systematic differences between segments in the repaying 
population.  
Methodology 
I approached this analysis as an operational problem, beginning with preliminary 
investigations into the various inputs, conducting some initial stress tests, and determining the 
areas that merit further consideration. The three major inputs I considered were (1) borrower 
needs, (2) institutional drivers of default, and (3) incentives of student loan servicers and 
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educational institutions in administering federal student loans. I also expanded the definition of 
“income-based repayment” (IBR) to include all of the repayment programs that meet two 
criteria: no lower limit on monthly repayment amounts and loan forgiveness at some point in 
time. Thus, “IBR” in this analysis should be read as a loose definition of program requirements.  
Borrower Needs Assessment 
Current news articles and research from think tanks studying higher education and/or 
financial products informed much of this analysis, particularly in determining variations in 
student loan borrower characteristics and potential implementation problems. This analysis 
includes information gathered from seven news stories and thirteen reports/press releases from 
think tanks. To determine risk factors that lead to default, I reviewed scholarly journal articles 
from related disciplines including economics (five articles), education (seven articles), and 
public policy and management (one article) found via Google Scholar, JStor, EconLit, WorldCat, 
and ProQuest. I also conducted interviews with professionals that work with borrowers of 
government subsidized loans, including Nieve Santana, Associate Director of Processing 
Services at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Alice Graulty, Match Savings and Cash for 
College Coordinator at Foundation Communities in Austin, TX, and Jacki White, Loan Fund 
Manager at Neighborworks Housing Services in West Rutland, Vermont.  
Analysis of Schools 
The Operations Performance Division (OPD) under the Federal Student Aid division 
publishes two-year cohort default rates annually. Although this is the most consistent set of 
publically available data, it has inherent limitations:  
 Each cohort year reflects a new group of students. 
 The data reflect the last school the student attended. 
 Students entering repayment includes graduates and dropouts.  
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Thus, my analysis of the two-year cohort default rates considers the limitations of the data.  
Given the categorical nature of analyzing default rates by school type, I sought to answer 
two questions: (1) Are there certain types of schools driving the increase in total default rates? 
(2) What is the approximate severity of a school’s default rate if you consider the average size of 
the loan and the percentage of students who borrow? For this analysis, I combined ED’s official 
default rates with data published by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in 2012.  
For comparison purposes, I used rates measured in 2002 for the 2000 two-year cohort, 
which marks the beginning of a fairly stable period and the most recent 2012 measurement of the 
2010 cohort. Noticing a tremendous increase in the number of students enrolled in the University 
of Phoenix, I recoded the for-profits with the largest repayment cohorts as “Ten Largest For-
Profits” (see Appendix II for the list of schools). Since the data also lumped together public 
schools with a wide range of program lengths and the literature suggests that community college 
default patterns significantly differ from four-year institutions, I recoded all public institutions 
that did not offer bachelor’s or master’s levels programs as “Community Colleges.” These labels 
are not mutually exclusive, as schools often have many types of programs.  
Analysis of Student Loan Servicers 
For an incentive analysis of the student loan servicers, I looked at three of the four 
servicers for organizational analysis: Nelnet, Sallie Mae and Pennsylvania Higher Education 
Assistance Agency (PHEAA). I excluded Great Lakes because they did not publish an Annual 
Report accessible online. Of these I focused more heavily upon comparisons between Sallie Mae 
and PHEAA because they provide strong contrasting models and because of personal access to 
their customer service system. I called these servicers many times with questions regarding 
details of the programs and cross-checked answers. The organizational analysis also includes an 
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assessment of the servicer’s Direct Loan Servicing contract with the ED compared against 
revenue potential and risk, as expressed in annual reports to shareholders. 
For a “snapshot” of current performance, I developed four questions about IBR options, 
all informational in nature, starting with general questions and ending with more complex. To 
improve the reliability of this measurement, I recruited classmates who have loans with various 
other servicers to call and ask these questions. Six participated and the survey covers all of the 
major Direct Loan servicers.  
Potential Effectiveness of Income Bases Repayment as Social Insurance 
In his first address to Congress, President Obama set a goal to make United States the 
world leader in producing college graduates per capita by 2020.
12
 Since 2002, college enrollment 
rates have increased by 34%, although graduation rates are less than 60%.
13
 This suggests that 
many Americans are realizing the need to enroll in higher education, but are leaving before 
benefiting from a degree, leading to debt without better credentials. IBR programs reduce the 
risk of taking out student loans, acting as a quasi-social insurance plan against crippling financial 
hardship.  
Like traditional social insurance, the plan one would rationally choose depends upon the 
borrower’s expectations for future financial health. Unlike social insurance, once ED pays the 
direct loan to the school, all subsequent cash flows move in the direction from the borrower to 
the government, and the individual bears the burden of delayed cash flows in the form of accrued 
interest. To qualify for the most generous and newest IBR program borrowers must demonstrate 
that annual payments under the standard repayment plan would be more than at least 10% of 
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discretionary income, taking into account family size. For a borrower in the first year of 
repayment with $20,000 of debt, the annual salary threshold for qualifying for IBR is $40,000, 
and for $100,000 of debt, the income threshold jumps to $150,000. This demonstrates that the 
programs are generous in their scope of targeted participants.  
 
As Chart 2 shows, there is great variation in the amount of money a borrower might 
actually pay according to the payment plan and their career path. In this stylized example, the 
borrower took out $30,000 in Direct Loans, has a job with a stagnant income, and has no change 
in family status.
14
 The monthly IBR payment is a third of the payment under the Standard Plan, 
allowing for greater monthly flexibility in repayment. If nothing changes financially for this 
borrower, the public insurance kicks in after twenty years of consistent repayment, forgiving 
$2,652 of the original principle borrowed, a $15,132 nominal subsidy when compared to the 
borrower who stayed in the standard program. However, because of the nature of interest 
accrual, if the same student  enjoys a major promotion in year five and only pays the minimum 
balance each month, s/he winds up paying more twice the amount as the standard borrower.  
 This variation in the amount borrowers might actually pay is not unique when comparing 
repayment plans, even under the old structures. Yet, this scenario illustrates that rational choice 
                                                 
14
 With a measurable discount rate, the additional years of repayment make the total payment under IBR consistently 
below that of the Standard Program because it is spread across more time (see Appendix III). However, in a situation 
where income is stagnant, the nominal effect will be more tangible to the borrower. Furthermore, communications 
between borrowers and servicers are presented in nominal values. 
Chart 2: Comparison of Payment Outcomes Between Plan 
Repayment Plan 
Years to 
Repay Monthly Payment 
Total Paid in Addition to 
Principle 
Balance Sheet 
Forgiveness 
Standard 10 $345   $                      13,470   $                   0    
IBR 20 $106   $                     (2,652)  $          54,887  
IBR 
+$20,000 Income in Yr 5 20 
Yr 1-5: $106 
Yr 6-20: $273  $                      26,136   $            6,796  
Note: Monthly payment determined by MyFedLoan.org’s Repayment Schedule Estimator. Based upon unmarried 
student with no dependents with $30,000 in debt at 6.8% interest rate and stagnant income of $30,000. 
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between repayment options depends upon predicting future job prospects. The potential for 
moral hazard looms for individuals with high preferences for expensive education and low 
preferences for high income.
15
 However, the future is inherently unpredictable, especially when 
people are over-leveraged and have only a small monetary buffer to counter financial 
emergencies. Within empirical studies, characteristics leading to an increased likelihood of 
default include age, race, parental marriage status and income, borrower’s income, degree 
completion, marital status of the borrower, and number of dependents.
16
 Although the 
significance between these characteristics varies, the story they tell is that borrowers are more 
likely to default if they have less access to gainful employment, fewer resources to rely on in 
case of financial emergencies, and more pressure to choose between uses of disposable income. 
Since these studies are based primarily on data from the 1980’s and early 1990’s, they may 
underestimate the degree to which the average American is vulnerable to financial hardship.
17
 By 
the early 2000’s the 75% of the average household income was dedicated to fixed monthly costs, 
making families particularly vulnerable to exogenous budget shocks and bankruptcy.
18
 However, 
since student loans can very rarely be forgiven in bankruptcy, they create a particularly sticky 
commitment for individuals experiencing financial hardship.  
One of the potential gaps in IBR programs is that it does not extend to the Parent PLUS 
program. Although PLUS loans are considered less risky because they require a credit check, 
parents can borrow up to the difference between student federal loans/grants and tuition and the 
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 On the public good side of this equation, borrowers who wish to go into low salary public service work may 
benefit from the 2008 Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, which forgives student loans after ten years of 
documented work in the public sector. On the cost side, variation in total repayment makes the financial stability of 
the system unclear. Some experts worry that ED undervalues these costs by as much as $300 billion (Howes, 2012)  
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 Hakim & Rashidian. “Student Loan Default” (1995); Volkwein et al. “Factors Associated with Student Loan 
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application does not require evidence of ability to repay. Student loan borrowers over fifty years 
old held nearly 17% of the outstanding past-due balance in 2012 and represent the fastest 
growing age group for student loan debt.
19
 A mixture of factors are likely driving this change 
including the possibility that parents may be shifting the financing of their children’s education 
away from private loans and towards federal loans (which would ultimately be an accounting 
change), increased school enrollment by older students, and increased borrowing due to the 
higher cost of school. Nonetheless, those in this population with PLUS loans have very limited 
access to flexible repayment programs, even though they may have some systematic 
vulnerabilities due to health problems or large fixed expenses.
20
  
The tradeoff between flexibility and the long-term cost of the program is an old 
discussion in student lending. In a study from 1977, surveyed students at University of 
Pennsylvania preferred the idea of the twenty year repayment plan until they saw the total 
interest they would have to pay according to the repayment schedule. At that point they reverted 
to preferring the standard plan.
21
 Although this seems to favor the status quo, the study also 
shows that students were able to choose the more responsible payment amount when presented 
with the outcomes.  
This idea could be very useful in choosing the best implementation options today. In a 
recent survey by the Young Invincibles, 60% of recent graduates said that they were “surprised 
by the terms of their loans or the student loan process” and 40% claimed had not receive exit 
loan counseling before leaving school.
22
 This may be an overestimate, since exit loan counseling 
                                                 
19
 Cooper. “An Educated Mess” (2012), 1. Notably, the author also points out that the over-50 population is less 
likely to pay back student loans because of fewer remaining working years. The budgetary cost-benefit of the IBR 
program is beyond the scope of this paper, but worthy of further consideration. 
20
 Parent PLUS loans grew by 40% since 2008, while private loans decreased by 33%, suggesting that some of the 
change might be due to shifting sources for additional college funding. (Data from Baum, Trends, 2012) 
21
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22
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can require as little as an online quiz that students may click through. However, these numbers 
also highlight that most students do not have a full understanding of the terms that they are 
agreeing to before borrowing student loans and are unpleasantly surprised when the first 
payment comes due. Furthermore, the survey showed that 89% of respondents strongly agreed 
that the IBR program should be the automatic repayment option when they started paying back 
their loans, suggesting that recent graduates currently desire more flexibility.
23
  
Although there is no empirical research on repayment structures’ effect on default rates, a 
recent theoretical model suggests that flexibility in repayment amounts and locked-in interest 
rates are key factors in reducing default rates.
24
 This also implies that increased complexity 
might have negative consequences, even if the complexity may mathematically add to a less 
expensive outcome overall. The combination of eight repayment options available for three or 
four types of loans—often spread out amongst multiple servicers—creates a scenario that is ripe 
for lower engagement due to choice fatigue. Following a “paternalistic libertarian” model 
founded in behavioral economics, we would want to simplify options and encourage the optimal 
solution for the student and society.
25
 However, it is also important to consider whether the 
population that drives changes in default rates require specific outreach efforts.  
Primary Drivers of Default Rates & Targeting Strategies 
Although the intuition behind the student loan system largely assumes that borrowers are 
youth with little to no credit history, the University of Phoenix’s parent company noted in their 
2012 annual report that they estimate that 73% of students were “non-traditional.”26 This large 
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proportion of non-traditional students further suggests that the theory behind default reduction 
efforts should not assume that the target population is twenty-three year old college graduates.  
By breaking down the change in defaulters over repayers by school type between 2000 
and 2010 (see Appendix IV for calculations), we see that the ten largest for-profit institutions 
account for 41% of the total 3.75% increase over the past decade (Chart 3). When combined with 
other 1866 proprietary schools, for-profits account for over 68.3% of the increase in default 
rates, followed by publicly funded community colleges, which account for 22.8%. All of the 
two-year cohort default rates reflect low estimates of actual default and may bias these numbers 
towards populations that may default early during the lifetime of the loan.
 27
 However, the two-
year cohort measure likely underestimates default rates for for-profits. In 2012, the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions found that many for-profit operations 
have committed “significant resources to 
sophisticated operations that keep students 
out of default for the duration of the 2-year 
(and now 3-year) monitoring window by 
aggressively signing students up for 
forbearance and deferment.”28  
Nonetheless, the power of these top 
ten schools in driving up default does not 
lie in the default rate change, but in the 
overall increase in enrollment in that sector. Enrollment in for-profit institutions has increased by 
                                                 
27
 All two-year default rates should be considered to be a low estimate. In a 2006 longitudinal study of the 1993 
Cohort, Susan Choy and Xiaoje Li found that student loan default rates peaked at four years and that 33% of 
borrowers were still repaying after ten years. Of those still making payments,11% were paying more than $250 per 
month (Choi & Li, 2006).  
28
 U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. For Profit Higher Education:(2012), 151 
41.0% 
27.3% 
22.8% 
4.7% 4.2% 
Chart 3 - Drivers of Change in  
Default Rates  
2000-2010 by School Type 
Ten Largest For-
Profits
For-Profit Schools
"Community College"
Public School, 4+
Years
Nonprofit Private
Schools
Data Source: U.S. Department of Education. Two-Year Official 
Cohort Default Rates for Schools (2000 & 2010 Cohorts)  
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more 450% over the last decade, compared to 30% for 4-year public institutions and non-
profits.
29
 Unfortunately, the schools with the largest gains also have the lowest 6-year graduation 
rates of 22%, compared to 55% for public institution, further underscoring that much of the 
increase in student loan defaults is unaccompanied by increases in degree-attainment.
30
 The 
increase in enrollments seen by all school types suggests that the for-profit market has not 
cannibalized more traditional programs, perhaps providing accessible options to students in a 
time when the recession has ignited demand for higher education. All of the schools included in 
the “top-ten” have online programs, and presumably a large portion of the increase of 
enrollments is connected to these offerings. More recently, enrollments have started to decline. 
University of Phoenix cites the adverse publicity stemming from increased scrutiny in the media 
and by the government as a likely cause, though they also may be reaching market saturation.
31
 
As striking as these numbers are, empirical research does not support the conclusion that 
entering a for-profit institution increases an individual’s chances of defaulting. Once 
employment, income, graduation status, and race are included in a multivariate regression 
analysis, none of the empirical studies reviewed for this analysis showed a statistically 
significant relationship between institution type and default.
32
 However, cause-effect relationship 
between school-type, graduation rates and future employment is still unclear, lending to an active 
debate as to whether institutions should be held accountable for their default rates. Some studies 
have shown that increased support of students in school reduces default rates,
33
 while others 
suggest the opposite.
34
 A 2010 study by the independent think tank, Education Sector, finds that 
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34
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schools’ student-faculty ratios consistently predicted lower default rates after disaggregating 
populations by school-type, suggesting that context-specific one-on-one interaction supports 
reduced defaults.
35
 This study also found that lower retention rates were significantly correlated 
with higher default rates for four-year institutions, but not two-year. This lack of significance is 
not encouraging for community colleges and two-year for-profit institutions as it implies that 
gaining a two-year degree does not reduce likelihood of financial hardship leading to default. 
Though, some studies suggest that attending a for-profit institution for an associates’ degree 
raises the likelihood of completion by as much as nine percentage points, this would unlikely 
help in reducing default rates for large portions of their student body.
36
 
Although default rates for for-profits are comparable to community colleges, the 
accompanying size of the loans are not. The average federal loan held by a community college 
student is only $4,093, about 35% less than the average loan held by a for-profit student in a two-
year program.
37
 Furthermore, approximately 85.6% of students in community college owe no 
student loans, compared to only 3.3% in two-year for-profit programs.
38
 From statistics provided 
in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Private Loans report, it is possible to estimate the 
approximate amount of default of federal loans expected for one-hundred students entering a 
program by school-type (Chart 4; see Appendix IV for calculations).  
Taking one year of costs into consideration, the expected dollar amount of default of the 
top ten largest for profit institutions is more than ten times larger than community colleges and 
more than twice that of public institutions. When considering the length of programs and the 
                                                 
35
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36
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total amount of debt accumulated, the proportions may change somewhat.
39
 However, this graph 
clearly illustrates the burden created when tuitions drive up the borrowing of student loans for 
populations with high risks of default. 
 
The effect of the growth of just a few institutions has important implications regarding 
targeting efforts to lower default rates. The largest of these schools have large recruitment efforts 
and tuition support, spending around 25% on revenue on admissions and marketing efforts, 
suggesting that the target population responds positively to proactive guidance.
40
 Alice Graulty, 
Cash for College Coordinator at Foundations Communities in Austin, TX noted that many of her 
clients who need to clear up past for-profit student loan debt do not realize that they even have 
outstanding debt because the school had taken care of the loan process.
41
 Businesswise, this 
helps remove the “hassle cost” of paperwork on enrollment decisions, which undecided and non-
                                                 
39
 However, higher debt due to more time in school does not appear to have a linear relationship with default, 
perhaps due to the “persistence” of  students that stay in school longer (Herr & Burt, Predicting (2005), 43), 
suggesting that these proportions may remain even after weighted by years in school.  
40
 Ibid.8. For example. The Apollo Group, parent company of University of Phoenix, spent approximately 25% of its 
$4.2B in revenue on marketing and admissions advisory. (Apollo Group, Annual Report (2012), 53). 
41
 Graulty, Alice, Phone Interview. (March 28, 2013) 
 $90,230  
 $66,945  
 $22,344  
 $17,051  
 $6,194  
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 $40,000
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 $80,000
 $100,000
10 Largest For-
Profits
Private for-Profit Private  Not-for-
Profit
Public 4-Year Community
Colleges
Chart 4: Expected Feferal Default by School Type Per 100 
Students 
(calculated assuming two semesters of borrowing) 
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traditional students may experience more intensely.
42
 Thus, efforts to reduce default rates for this 
large portion of students entering repayment should include engagement at the point of loan, and 
be as simple and proactive as possible.  
From a partnership-development perspective, there appears to be several opportunities for 
working with for-profits on financial education and default reduction efforts. The advantages of 
working with the largest for-profits include access to students at the point of making a loan and 
well-funded administrative personnel support and marketing. While research only loosely 
supports the effectiveness of counseling in reducing student loan default rates, research from the 
nonprofits working with high risk populations in homeownership indicates that counseling helps 
in guiding borrowers to smarter repayment options, but not in reducing default propensities.
43
 
Jacki White, Loan Fund Manager at NeighborWorks of Western Vermont, echoed this sentiment, 
“When we are intense in emphasizing what will happen [if they do not repay], the better the 
behavior… when people do not know what to do, they try to ignore the problem hoping it will go 
away, but it doesn’t.”44 Thus, there could be a major education opportunity to promote the IBR 
programs early on if it is framed as a strategy to enroll borrowers in a “smarter” plan and 
emphasizes the serious consequences for avoiding student loans once in repayment. With 
enrollment numbers down, there may be some reluctance to discuss the seriousness of loan 
repayment options for fear of scaring away customers in their target market. Nonetheless, the 
corporate for-profits will need to strategize ways to reduce negative publicity due to high default 
rates, and IBR programs may provide a particularly convenient way to do so.  
However, the larger issues of increasing student debt without correlating educational 
outcomes have broader public value implications, which an overly successful IBR effort might 
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hide. It seems reasonable incorporate size, cost, and percentage of students borrowing into 
federal loan eligibility calculations, in order to promote less expensive use of taxpayer resources 
for underwriting access to education. Recently proposed gainful employment rules attempted to 
change regulations in that spirit, although a federal judge vacated them in March 2013.
45
 
Another, strategy would be to increase Pell Grant access and lower loan limits for the first year 
of school to decrease initial student debt and allow folks to “try out” higher education with less 
upfront risk.
46
 A cost benefit analysis would be necessary to assess the budgetary and social 
impacts of this strategy.  
Incentives of Student Loan Servicers 
Over the past several years, student loan servicers have seen tremendous changes in their 
revenue generation due to the major shifts in the structure of federal student loans. From 1965 to 
2010, many servicers of federal loans also lent federally guaranteed loans through the FFELP. 
This created a system where banks and lenders could grant loans to students with a guarantee 
from the federal government that they would be largely repaid. From 2000 to 2010, 72% of loans 
guaranteed by the federal government were originated through this structure, equivalent to 
approximately $426.2 billion before interest accrual.
47
 
The program was designed to incentivize banks to lend to students at or below a 
maximum interest rate of 7.9%, a relatively low rate for lending to those with no credit history.
48
 
However, servicers could also be collectors of defaulted loans, and so revenue generation could 
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include servicing fees, maximizing interest payments by allowing for the maximum amount of 
forbearance, and additional collection fees up to 16.2% o of the outstanding loan once a 
borrower enters default.
49
 In an episode of 60 Minutes in 2006, then Harvard professor and 
bankruptcy expert Elizabeth Warren warned that the current structure allowed for lenders to 
“play every hand at the poker table.”50   
From the perspective of the cost to the government, supporting the FFELP system cost 
twice as much as direct loans; the subsidy structure reimbursed collection agencies for successful 
collection efforts on defaulted loans and for defaulted loans with low repayment prospects.
51
 
When the Obama Administration ended the program in 2010, the Congressional Budget Office 
estimated $68.7 billion in savings for the federal government over 10 years.
52
  
For servicers like Sallie Mae and PHEAA, this resulted in significant losses on their 
balance sheets. In addition to cash flows related directly to the loan, portfolios of loans could be 
repackaged and sold to investors as low-risk student loan asset backed securities (SLABS) and 
provide a second source for revenue through the financial markets.
53
 Although the program 
ended two years ago and the related assets will amortize over the next twenty years, FFELP 
related services currently generate 72% of student loan related revenue for Sallie Mae.
54
  
Since 2010, the Department of Education has been the sole originator of Direct Student 
Loans. The servicing for the repayment of these loans is contracted out to a combination of four 
major servicers--Sallie Mae, PHEAA, Nelnet, and Great Lakes—and thirteen smaller servicers. 
Nelnet and Sallie Mae are for-profit public companies, while the rest are non-profits, many of 
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which also service state grants and financial aid. The new contracts created by the ED pay these 
servicers on a per-unit basis based upon the composition of borrowers in repayment; servicers 
receive $2.11 per month for students in good standing and only $0.50 for students in default (see 
Appendix VI for Price Table). Annual allocations of student loans are based upon a formula that 
includes default status per unit, total defaulted dollars outstanding, and survey ratings by 
borrowers, schools, and the U.S. Office of Student Aid (Appendix VII).  
When considering the scope of the contract only, it appears that student loan servicers 
have every incentive to keep students in good standing for repayment since future market shares 
of the Direct Loan business units rely winning contracts based upon good default aversion 
outcomes and customer service. However, this contract with the Federal Government accounts 
for only 1.3% of Sallie Mae’s annual revenues—generating $84 million compared to $2.7 billion 
in FFELP and $2.5 billion in consumer servicing revenues.
55
 From a business perspective, the 
new structure does not provide much of a growth market compared to other consumer lending 
activities. Accordingly, Sallie Mae’s primary strategies for delivering shareholder value do not 
include federal direct loans. Instead, management is focusing on growing consumer-lending 
segment assets and revenues, reducing operating expenses, and maximizing cash flows from 
FFELP Loans.
56
 The lack of attention towards Direct Loans from the country’s largest servicer 
shows. In the 2012 ED Allocation Metric, it ranked last in overall performance (Appendix VII).  
From the outside, it is difficult to assess the level of any of the company’s commitments 
to meeting the spirit of the new contract structure. The company that scored highest in customer 
service was PHEAA, a non-profit organization with $497.4 million in 2012 operating revenues 
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that uses profits from its operations to generate grant aid in Pennsylvania.
57
 It appears to be 
taking on federal student loan servicing with gusto, creating a separate website called 
“Myfedloans.org” and aggressively seeking out and winning special contracts, such as the Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness Program. Furthermore a “snapshot” customer service survey of the 
four major servicers revealed little meaningful variation in the content of answers and 
friendliness of customer service representatives (see Appendix VIII).
58
 
Still, it is possible to consider current market incentives and consider their likely impact 
on repayment counseling and internal policies. Under the current system, counseling is highly 
customized to the borrower’s situation and the nature of the advice appears to lean towards 
encouragement of early repayment and the promotion of the new Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness Program.
59
 Servicers were quite open to talking about the usefulness of IBR in 
helping folks get through economic hardship. 
Although actual overhead costs related to Direct Loan servicing are not published, 
servicers presumably have several overhead costs that currently make IBR more costly than the 
standard program due to the annual paperwork requirements for income verification. In theory, 
the value of getting students at risk of default into IBR would equal the loss that they would 
expect to undergo without the program. Assuming a 4% annual increase in the number of high 
risk borrowers entering repayment per year and three million borrowers entering repayment per 
year, the value of default-aversion activities could be as high as $2.3 million annually. However, 
isolating the high risk population is a challenge, especially considering that the average 
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American is now more vulnerable to unexpected financial emergencies than in the recent past. 
Some targeting efforts under the status quo could include flagging students that dropped out of 
their programs or developing outreach efforts to those who also received Pell Grants—which 
correlate well with pre-loan predictors of default.
60
  
Despite additional annual paperwork, making the IBR program the automatic option 
would have several benefits for servicers. Currently there are so many repayment options that 
counselors need significant training to help students find the best options given their situation, 
which can include heavy training and personnel costs. Simplified choices would likely reduce 
these.
61
 It would also provide the output of higher IBR enrollment, likely reducing defaults and 
increase access to higher fees under the servicing contract.  
On the practical side of implementation, determining the income necessary to calculate 
the repayment amount, especially on the first bill, could prove to be a significant challenge, and 
presents certain tradeoffs. If the initial bill is too small, the borrower who is new to repayment 
may underestimate the cost of paying too little in the beginning of repayment, creating a situation 
where the borrower ultimately pays more for their student loan.
62
 However, a bill that is too large 
might create panic and lead to unproductive avoidance behavior. Considering that payments 
generally begins six months after entering repayment, the borrower who completed a spring 
semester would only have four months to get into trouble before tax season creates a natural 
opportunity to reassess the minimum repayment amount. For those who drop out or graduate in 
December, however, the window would be large enough for an individual to reach default status. 
Early and intense messaging about first the availability of help, second the accrued interest that 
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might build with minimum payments, and finally the consequences for avoiding repayment 
could nudge borrowers to in fixing account problem early. Even though automatic enrollment in 
IBR would likely still have flaws, these problems could even help encourage borrower 
engagement early in the process. A combination of automatic enrollment in IBR and careful 
messaging contrasts with the current standard structure which appears to rely more heavily on 
proactive borrower inquiry.  
The benefits to the servicer of transferring old FFELP loans into an IBR, whether on a 
case-by-case basis or through an automatic program, is less clear. As mentioned, servicers 
generate revenue under the FFELP program through collecting interest, servicing fees, collection 
fees, and income related to the conversion of student loan portfolios into SLABS and selling 
them to traders in the financial market. The changes in the 2008 legislation altered this formula, 
allowing FFELP loans to be covered by IBR, whether consolidated with Direct Loans or not, and 
opening a door to loan forgiveness.  
Considering this and the loss of access to new guaranteed loans, a great deal of emphasis 
has shifted to packaging private loans and presumably old FFELP loans into securities for 
investors. Although the asset backed securities market largely lost salience during the financial 
crisis, SLABS appear to be regaining some momentum as higher risk, but higher yield 
investments. As recently as March, Sallie Mae sold $1.1 billion worth of new student loan 
securities to Wall Street.
63
 Although the portfolio of assets used to create these securities likely 
consists of private loans, the critical point is that securitization invites investors to influence the 
servicers’ corporate logic. Should actively traded SLABS include FFELP loans, servicers would 
have additional contractual obligations to the shareholders about the handling of the accounts. 
                                                 
63
 Hanover, Nancy. “Wall Street Turns Profit in Student Loan Debt” (World Socialist Website, March 11, 2013) 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/03/11/loan-m11.html  
23 
 
This could create incentives that do not benefit the student loan borrower, and may skew internal 
policies for servicing old loans. Thus, the calculus of “maximizing cash flows from the FFELP 
program” may include supportive counseling in order to improve the stability of the security. 
However, it could also include allowing delinquency and default to work in the servicer’s favor 
in the form of fees and ballooning principal. Considering the forgiveness aspect of the IBR 
program, it doesn’t seem logical for servicers to proactively promote this program to borrowers 
with FFELP loans, as it could result in an eventual loss for the investors. 
Discussion of IBR Implementation Options 
IBR is an example of a policy that should have a resounding effect in reducing default 
rates as it provides a generous and flexible answer to an individual’s financial hardships. From 
diving into the literature and recent news of the program, it appears that it still may be too early 
to assess the programs potential effectiveness, given the time necessary to fundamentally change 
the loan origination and repayment structures. Furthermore, only three cohorts of students 
entering repayment under the new structure have been measured, further underscoring the 
limitations for assessing success. After all, cohort default rates did not drop for two years after 
the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, assuming that the decrease was not confounded 
by other factors from the time (see Chart 1 for reference). 
In determining whether to make IBR programs the automatic option, certain probable 
limits should be recognized. First, the program would not solve some underlying issues with the 
highest risk population. In my interview with Foundation Communities’ Cash for College 
Coordinator, Graulty pointed out that many who come to speak with her know that they have 
debt, but have trouble keeping track of it because they have moved several times and do not have 
24 
 
easy access to a computer.
64
 More proactive default reduction outreach efforts would likely be 
necessary to effectively meet the needs of this population. Furthermore, there may be alternative 
reasons why people go into default that go beyond ability to pay. For instance, in a survey of a 
small sample of defaulted borrowers seeking legal aid, 47% said that they should not have to 
repay. The two primary reasons included uselessness of the degree and frustration about having 
already paid multiples of the principle.
65
 However, the actual size of this population is unknown, 
and these sentiments may be partially avoided if repayment amounts better match ability to pay.   
Furthermore, although the program might add value in financial leniency, making it the 
automatic option would add some burden of paperwork to the borrower due to the need to 
provide annual proof of income. Currently, the IBR online qualification system is connected with 
the Internal Revenue Service’s system, making it fairly simple to prove income requirements. 
However, the system is very particular about inputs and will not work if there is variation from 
last year’s tax return. For example an error will occur if you input “apt” instead of “apartment” in 
the address field.
66
 Some customers may not appreciate yearly interaction with servicers in order 
to prove income. However, if the program is linked with tax preparation, the burden of an extra 
interaction could be largely reduced. Considering that the official threshold for “default status” is 
270 days delinquent, this leaves a window of only 96 days where a person could go into full 
default without having their income incorporated into the repayment formula. 
More targeted populations could be selected to be automatically enrolled in IBR, which 
could be combined with upfront counseling initiatives or requirements based upon at risk 
populations. For instance, targeting students who have also received Pell Grants for increased 
loan counseling and automatic enrollment in the income-based repayment program could 
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improve the programs impact without the negative implications that might accompany other 
targeting methods. Students who drop out of their programs could also be flagged. However, by 
targeting specific populations, the loan servicers would likely gain fewer cost reductions related 
to the level of expertise necessary to effectively guide students to the best available program, 
which may reduce buy-in from this important stakeholder. 
Whether the status quo is maintained or IBR as an automatic option is extended to all 
new cohorts entering repayment, the population’s old loans under the FFELP program present a 
unique challenge. Since the last FFELP loan was issued as recently as 2010, borrowers will 
continue to be repaying under this framework for many more years, and the incentive suggests 
that servicers may not proactively recommend IBR to this population. However, mandating that 
servicers transfer all old FFELP loans into an IBR plan may not be an appropriate solution either. 
There are 37 million people currently in repayment and 7 million who have entered repayment 
since the end of the FFELP program. Since 72% of loans under the old structure were through 
FFELP, we can conservatively estimate that 70% of the loans held by 30 million Americans are 
still in this program.
67
 Requiring that all of these people report their income in order to calculate 
the IBR payment would be a complicated and costly undertaking, and would likely confuse 
people who are currently in good standing with their loans. Thus, a more feasible option for the 
federal government might be to offer targeted educational and incentive programs so that those 
who would benefit from the program might self-select. Analyzing the FFELP and Direct Loan 
consolidation initiative in 2011 might provide some insights as to the best approach. A second 
option would be to pay special attention to the defaulting behavior on older loans and to provide 
some incentives (or rules) to servicers for proactively transferring delinquent borrowers to 
flexible payment plans.  
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Recommendation 
Even considering these caveats, the generosity and flexibility that IBR offers seems to 
meet the needs of many who are unnecessarily suffering from high student loan payments. In 
order to explore the best way to improve the impact of the program, I recommend developing 
two pilot programs. First, since much of the rise in the default rate can be traced to just ten for-
profit institutions and those same institutions are suffering from the negative publicity related to 
increased default rates, there is a unique opportunity to make a large impact by developing a few 
key partnerships with for-profit institutions. A pilot program could test various counseling 
techniques to promote education about the current flexibilities of the current financial aid 
structure, as well as serious consequences associated with avoiding repayment, especially prior 
to the disbursement of the loan. Such an initiative would target the right population, leverage 
well-funded admission resources that already exist in these schools, and likely help these for-
profits in reducing the risks and poor publicity associated with high default rates.  
Second, ED should partner with servicers to test making IBR programs the automatic 
option for borrowers entering repayment, especially testing whether it (1) negatively impacts 
default rates and (2) systematically impacts some groups more than others. This would improve 
understanding of the effectiveness of IBR and help inform future policy decisions. Participating 
servicers would also benefit from increased revenue due to the higher per unit fees related to 
effective default prevention and better internal understanding default reduction techniques that 
may result in a competitive advantage for future contracts.  
Following these recommendations would allow for data-driven implementation 
improvements within the federal student loan system. More broadly, efforts to reduce the 
financial risk of higher education debt supports the ambition that Americans, no matter their 
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situation, can strive to better their own lives. Higher education is increasingly a prerequisite for 
individuals to join the middle class and for nations to maintain their global competitiveness. 
However, rising costs of education and tighter markets also increases its financial riskiness to the 
individual. Thus, meeting the financial needs of those who try to obtain a degree is a key aspect 
in achieving the President’s goal to be the most educated country in the world.  
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Appendices  
Appendix I – Student Loan Comparisons  
 
  
Standard Income-Contingent Income-Based Pay as You Earn Public Service Loan Forgivenes
Date Inacted *NA 7/1/1994 7/1/2009 12/21/2012 10/1/2007
Implementation 
Notes
*in 2009 government 
began originating all 
federally guaranteed loans
*None *Not added to repayment 
on drop-down menu until 
March 2010
*October 2011, DOE rolled 
out new website and 
there were majore delays 
in enrollment in IBR 
(included 50,000 who 
wound up "defaulting" 
due to glitches)
*None reported *Tracking form became 
available January 2012
Restricted to NA *None *Partial Financial Hardship - 
Standard payment/mo  > 
Income Based program 
*Do not qualify for "Pay as 
You Earn"
*Partial Financial Hardship - 
Standard payment/mo  > 
Pay as You Earn program
*New Borrowers
*Borrowers working in 
public service
*Repayments made after 
October 1, 2007
Loans that Qualify *All direct loans, FFEL 
loans
*Federal Direct loans *Federal Direct loans
*FFEL loans 
*Federal Direct loans
*Consolidated FFEL loans 
*Federal Direct (all, 
including Parent PLUS)
*Consolidated FFEL loans 
Loans that Don't 
Qualify
*Private *Defaulted loans*
*FFEL Loans (cannot 
consolidate)
*Parent PLUS loans
*Private loans
*Defaulted loans*
*FFEL Loans (must 
consolidate)
*Parent PLUS loans
*Private loans
*Defaulted loans*
*FFEL Loans (must 
consolidate)
*Parent PLUS loans
*Private loans
*Extended and graduated 
payments
*FFEL loans
*Private loans
Minimum Payment *$50 *$0 *$0 *$0 *$0
Payment Formula *Based on total loans and 
10 years to repay
*Adjusted gross family 
income  and family size
*Complex formula based 
upon adjusted gross family 
income and family size
*Recalculated annually 
*15% of adjusted gross 
family income  (income - 
150% of poverty line) and 
family size
*Recalculated annually 
*10% of adjusted gross 
family income  (income - 
150% of poverty line) and 
family size
*Recalculated annually 
*Pay as you earn, IBR, ICR, 
standard, any plan 
equivalent to standard
Discharge NA *25 years *25 years *20 years *10 years
Notes
Sources http://www.myfedloan.org/billing-payment/payment-plans/index.shtml
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/04/18/problems-plague-education-department-debt-management-process
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2011/03/23/income-based-vs-income-contingent-loan-repayment
*According to a discussion with a Sallie Mae representative about my FFELP loans - if your account is >90 days due, you are in "default" and 
there will be a late fee. However, they can put your account into forbearance retroactively  to put you back in good standing and get you 
into a program. Also, you can make payments to rehabilitate your loan, and then qualify for the program. (4/11/13)
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Appendix II – For-Profits Recoded to “Ten Largest For-Profits” 
 
Appendix III – Comparison of Outcomes Between Plans with Net Present Values 
 
Appendix IV – Calculations for Drivers of the Change in Default Rates, 2000-2010 
PP=Percentage Point Change in Default by School-Type 
D=Number of defaulters by School-Type 
TR=Total Number Entering Repayment  
TC=Total Change in Default Rate 
 
PP=(D10 / TR10) – (D00 /TR00) 
 
Drivers of Change in Default Rate = PP/TC 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education. Two-Year Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools (2000 & 2010 Cohorts) 
NAME State Program Length
Defaulted 
Borrowers
 Entered 
Repayment
Default 
Rate
University of Phoenix Arizona Master's or Doctor's 41,148       229,393               18%
ITT Technical Institute Indiana Master's or Doctor's 7,127          42,959                 17%
Kaplan University Iowa Master's or Doctor's 7,053          41,819                 17%
DeVry University Illinois Master's or Doctor's 4,361          32,588                 13%
Ashford University Iowa Master's or Doctor's 2,494          24,319                 10%
Strayer University District of Columbia Master's or Doctor's 1,912          22,219                 9%
Colorado Technical University Colorado Master's or Doctor's 2,399          18,065                 13%
American InterContinental University Illinois Master's or Doctor's 2,497          17,598                 14%
Grand Canyon University Arizona Master's or Doctor's 1,994          16,490                 12%
Walden University Minnesota Master's or Doctor's 368             12,882                 3%
Top Ten Largest For-Profits by Number Entering Repayment in 2010 
Source: U.S. Department of Education. Two-Year Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools (2000 & 2010 Cohorts) 
Payment Plan
Years to 
Repay
Monthly 
Payment
Nominal 
Payment
Total Nominal 
Payment Less 
Principle
Nominal 
Balance Sheet 
Forgiveness NPV Payment
NPV of Total 
Payment Less 
Principle
NPV Balance 
Sheet 
Forgiveness
NPV 
Payment2
NPV of Total 
Payment Less 
Principle3
NPV Balance 
Sheet 
Forgiveness4
Standard 10 $345 43,470$   13,470$          -$                34,278$          (890)$            -$               29,110$    (890)$              -$              
IBR 20 $106 27,348$   (2,652)$           54,887$         19,719$          (15,552)$       25,100$         14,448$    (15,552)$         14,212$       
IBR
+$20,000 
Income in Yr 5 20
Yr 1-5: $106
Yr 6-20: $273 56,136$   26,136$          6,796$           21,997$          (14,028)$       $3,102 15,972$    (14,028)$         1,756$         
Note: Based upon unmarried student with no dependents, stagnant income, and  $30,000 in debt at 6.8% interest rate.Calculated using MyFedLoan.org's Repayment Schedule 
Estimator, under the "Pay as You Earn" Program. 
Account Plan
Comparison of Payment Outcomes Between Plans
4% Discount RateNominal Payments 7% Discount Rate
School Type # Institutions # Repayers # Defaulters
Defaulters/ 
Total Repayers # Institutions # Repayers # Defaulters
Defaulters/ 
Total Repayers
Percentage 
Point Change 
in Default 
Driver of 
Default Rate 
Change
Ten Largest 
For-Profits 9                           53,429              3,533             0.1% 10                      458,332         71,353              1.7% 1.5% 41.0%
For-Profit 
Schools 1,809                   317,925            28,262          1.2% 1,866                816,316         93,924              2.2% 1.0% 27.3%
"Community 
College" 1,356                   307,252            26,583          1.1% 1,169                629,356         83,739              2.0% 0.9% 22.8%
Public School, 
4+ Years 583                      1,015,307        44,706          1.9% 634                    1,404,957     87,431              2.1% 0.2% 4.7%
Nonprofit 
Private 
Schools 1,756                   665,907            23,232          1.0% 1,633                910,462         48,151              1.1% 0.2% 4.2%
Total 5,513                   2,359,820        126,316        5.4% 5,312                4,219,423     384,598            9.1% 3.8%
2002 Measure of 2000 Cohort 2012 Measure of 2010 Cohort
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Appendix IV – Calculating  
Percentage of Students Borrowing by Loan and School Type 
  
Source: CFPB. Private Student Loans. (2012) 
 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
No Loans
Both Non-Private
and Private Loans
Non-Private Loans
Only
Private Loans Only
School Type
Federal Loans 
(when mixed 
with private)
Non-
Private 
Loans Only
Federal Loans 
(when mixed 
with private)
Non-Private 
Loans Only
Federal $ per 
100 entering 
repayment
Default 
Rates
Percenta
ge 
Total 
Expected 
Default
10 Largest For-Profits 5,923 6,477 44.7 49 582131.1 16% 90,230$       
Private for-Profit 5,923 6,477 44.7 49 582131.1 12% 66,945$       
Private  Not-for-Profit 6,641 8,160 20.6 34.9 421588.6 5% 22,344$       
Public 4-Year 5,595 6,706 9.6 33 275010 6% 17,051$       
Community Colleges 3,831 4,093 1.9 9.6 46571.7 13% 6,194$          
Source: CFPB. Private Loans. (2013); ED Official 2 Year Cohort Default Rates(2012)
Calculation of Expected Dollars ind Default
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Appendix VI 
Current ED Contract with Student Loan Servicers 
Status Volume Low Volume High Unit Price 
Borrowers in School Status  na   na   $        1.05  
Borrowers in Grace or Current Repayment Status 1 3,000,000  $        2.11  
  3,000,001 UP  $        1.90  
Borrowers in Deferment or Forbearance 1 1,600,000  $        2.07  
  1,600,001 UP  $        1.73  
Borrowers 31-90 Days Delinquent  na   na   $        1.62  
Borrowers 91-150  Days Delinquent  na   na   $        1.50  
Borrowers 151-270 Days Delinquent  na   na   $        1.37  
Borrowers 270+ Days Delinquent  na   na   $        0.50  
Source: Title IV Student Loan Management/Servicing. Sallie Mae Redacted Contract Award (June 6, 2013) 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=c845bdd7d98de24fe163b8a55e5f76a8&tab=core&_cview=1   
Appendix VII 
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Appendix VIII – Customer Service Survey Results 
 
  
Loan Service 
Provider (required)
If I am without work 
when my grace period 
ends, what would you 
recommend I do?
I’m particularly curious about the 
income based program. Under what 
conditions would you recommend 
that I enroll in the income based 
program? Why?
Are there problems with 
the income based 
repayment program?
Theoretically - What if I get a very 
well paying job after 18 years in 
the income based repayment 
program?  Would I have to start 
the standard program again from 
year 0?
Rating of 
Customer 
Service
FedLoan Servicing Defer Economic Hardship Must reapply each year na 10
Sallie Mae Defer Qualification Not qualifying Reapply 5
Nelnet IBR & Defer Economic Hardship Interest accrual Have to start paying at higher rate
Do not lose 18 years of repayment 
history 
9
Great Lakes IBR & Defer Offered technical help to enroll Interest accrual No.  10
Great Lakes Defer Qualification Interest accrual - 
although forgiven  after 
25 years
No.  10
FedLoan Servicing Defer Offered technical help to enroll Longer process No. 9
33 
 
References 
Apollo Group. Annual Report. (2012)  
Baum, Sandy and Kathleen Payea. Trends in Student Aid. (CollegeBoard Advocacy & Policy Center, 
2012) 
Bidwell, Allie. “Judge Refuses to Restore Vacated Provisions of 'Gainful Employment' Rule.” (Chronicle 
in Higher Education. (March 20, 2013) http://chronicle.com/article/Judge-Refuses-to-Restore/138029/ 
Brown, Meta, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Maricar Mabutas, and Wilbert van Der Klaauw. 
“Grading Student Loans.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Liberty Street Economics. (March 05, 
2012). http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/03/grading-student-loans.html (Accessed 
April 15, 2013). 
Brown, Meta & Sydnee Caldwell Hough. “Student Loan Borrowers Retreat from Housing and Auto 
Markets.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Liberty Street Economics. (April 17, 2013). 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/young-student-loan-borrowers-retreat-from-
housing-and-auto-markets.html 
Brugal, John F. & Gary P. Johnson. “The Demand for Student Loans in Higher Education: A Study of 
Preferences and Attitudes.” Research in Higher Education. Vol.6 (1977) 65-83 
Choy, Susan P. and Xiaojie Li. Dealing With Debt: 1992-93 Bachelor's Degree Recipients 10 Years 
Later. National Center for Education Statistics, US Department of Education, NCES. (June 2006). 
http://nces.ed.gov/das/epubs/2006156/index.asp     
CollegeBoard. Education Pays. (2010) 
CollegeBoard. Fulfilling the Commitment: Recommendations for Reforming Federal Student Aid. (2008) 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.S. 
Department of Education Joint Report Finds a Cycle of Boom and Bust in Private Student Loan 
Market.( July 19, 2012)  
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Private Student Loans. (August 29, 2012) 
Corbett, Christianne & Caterine Hill. Graduating to a Pay Gap: The Earnings of Women and Men One 
Year After College Graduation. American Association of University Women. (2012) 
Demming, David J., Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. The For-Profit Postsecondary School Sector: 
Nimble Critters or Agile Predators? (Working Paper). (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
December, 2011) 
Dillon, Erin and Robin V. Smiles. Lowering Student Loan Default Rates: What One Consortium of 
Historically Black Institutions Did to Succeed. (Education Sector,  2011) 
34 
 
Doyle, William R. A New Partnership: Reshaping the Federal and State Commitment to Need-Based Aid. 
(Committee for Economic Development, January, 2013 
Equal Justice Works. “Income-Based vs. Income-Contingent Loan Repayment.” US News. (March 23, 
2011). http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2011/03/23/income-based-vs-
income-contingent-loan-repayment 
Edmiston, Kelly D., Lara Brooks, and Steven Shepelwich. Student Loans: Overview and Issues. Kansas 
City: The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (August, 2012) 
Equal Justice Works. “Learn what Obama’s Student Loan Plan Means for You.” U.S. News – Student 
Loan Ranger. (November 9, 2011). http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-
ranger/2011/11/09/learn-what-obamas-student-loan-plan-means-for-you (Accessed April, 28, 2013)  
Federal Education Budget Project. “Federal Student Loan Programs – History” New America Foundation. 
(Last updated March 28, 2012) http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-
programs-history 
Federal Student Aid. “Final Calculation of Fourth Year’s Allocation – Attachment to August 2012 
Electronic Announcement.” (accessed April 27, 2013)  
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/attachments/083012LSICustServPerformResultsandAlllocInfo
AttachFinalCalcFourthYearAlloc.pdf  
Fedloan Servicing. “Billing and Payment Plans.”  (accessed April 27, 2013) 
http://www.myfedloan.org/billing-payment/payment-plans/index.shtml  
Field, Kelly. “Glitch May Block Student Borrowers From Enrolling in Income-Based Repayment.” 
Chronicle of Higher Education. (October 8, 2009) http://chronicle.com/article/Glitch-May-Block-
Student/48748/ 
Field, Kelly. “Government Vastly Undercounts Defaults.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. (July 15, 
2010) 
Hakim, Sam Ramsey & M. Rashidian. “Student Loan Default: Borrower Characteristics, Institutional 
Practices, and the Business Cycle.” Journal of Education Finance, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1995), 449-
466 
Hanover, Nancy. “Wall Street Turns Profit in Student Loan Debt” (World Socialist Website, 
March 11, 2013) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/03/11/loan-m11.html (Accessed April 
30, 2013)  
Herr, E., & L. Burt. “Predicting Student Loans Default for the University of Texas at Austin.” Journal of 
Student Financial Aid. Vol. 35. No. 2.. (2005), 27-49. 
Howes, Cooper. “Student Loans: An Educated Mess” Barclays Special Economics Research Report. 
(December 5, 2012)  
35 
 
H.R. 4137 (110th): Higher Education Opportunity Act as of Feb 07, 2008. 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr4137/text/eh (March 30, 2012) 
Ionescu, Felicia. “The Federal Student Loan Program: Quantitative Implications for College Enrollment 
and Default Rates.” (Review of Economic Dynamics, 2009) Vol. 12, 205-231 
Jaschick, Scott. “60 Minutes’ vs. Sallie Mae.” (Inside Higher Ed, May, 2006)  
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/05/08/salliemae#ixzz2QlGOPoTo  
Kane, Thomas. The Price of Admission: Rethinking How Americans Pay for College. (1999) 
Kantrowitz, Mark. “Direct Loans vs. the FFEL Program.” http://www.finaid.org/loans/dl-vs-ffel.phtml 
(Accessed April 10, 2013) 
Knapp, Laura Green & Terry G. Seaks. “An Analysis of the Probability of Default on Federally 
Guaranteed Student Loans.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 3 (August, 1992), 
404-411 
Loonin, Deanne. The Student Loan Default Trap: Why Borrows Default and What Can be Done. National 
Consumer Law Center (2012) 
Lucas, Deborah & Damien Moore, “Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of Student Loans.” 
Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk, ed. Deborah Lucas (University of Chicago Press, 
2010) 163 – 205 
Mishory, Jen & Rory O’Sullivan. Student Perspective on Federal Financial Aid Reform.  (Washington 
DC: Young Invincibles, November, 2012)  
Nelson, Libby A. “No Way Out of Default.” Inside Higher Ed. (April 18, 2012).  
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/04/18/problems-plague-education-department-debt-
management-process#ixzz2RuU5UWDG  
Nelson, Libby A. “Despite Student Debt concern, Income-Based Repayment Lags.” Inside Higher Ed 
(October 23, 2012) 
New America Foundation. “Federal Student Loans History.” (March, 2012) 
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-history 
(Accessed April 29, 2013)  
New York State Higher Education Services Corporation. “Frequently Asked Questions – 
Defaulted FFEL Loans” 
http://www.hesc.ny.gov/content.nsf/SFC/Frequently_Asked_Questions_Defaulted_FFEL_Loans 
(Accessed April 17, 2013) 
Quercia, Robert & Jonathan Spader. “Does Homeownership Counseling Affect the Prepayment and 
Default Behavior of Affordable Mortgage Borrowers.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 
Vol. 27, No. 2 (2008) 304-325 
36 
 
Sallie Mae.  Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012. Sallie Mae  website. 
https://www.salliemae.com/about/investors/stockholderinfo/annualreports/default.aspx (Accessed April 
14, 2013) 
Stockham, David H. and Jon S. Hesseldenz. “Predicting National Direct Student Loan Defaults: The Role 
of Personality Data.” Research in Higher Education, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1979) 195-205 
Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sunstein. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness. (New York: Penguin, 2009) 
U.S. Department of Education. Office of Financial Assistance, Ensuring Student Loan Repayment: A 
National Handbook of Best Practices (2000) 
U.S. Department of Education. Strategic Plan, FY 2011-2014. (accessed April 26, 2013) 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2011-14/plan-2011.pdf 
U.S. Department of Education. “Student Loans Overview.” Fiscal Year 2013. (accessed April 26, 2013) 
U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. For Profit Higher Education: The 
Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success. (July 30, 2012) 
Volkwein, J. Fredericks & Alberto F. Cabrera, Bruce P. Szelest, & Michelle R. Napierski. “Factors 
Associated with Student Loan Default Among Different Rational and Ethnic Groups.”  Journal of 
Higher Education. Vol. 69, No. 2. (1998), 206-237 
Volkwein, J. Fredericks & Bruce P. Szelest. “Individual and Campus Characteristics Associated with 
Student Loan Default.” Research in Higher Education. Vol. 36, No.1 (Feb. 1995) 41-72 
Wang, Marian. “Student Loan Borrowers Dazed and Confused by Servicer Shuffle.” Propublica. (April 
23, 2012)  
Warren, Elizabeth. “Collapse of the Middle Class.”(Paper presented at  UC Berkeley Graduate Council 
Lectures, June 2007)  (Uploaded January 31, 2008) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akVL7QY0S8A 
(Accessed April 27, 2013) 
